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# Russia's Rassvet Satellites Will Threaten Ukraine with Better Drone Strikes
- URL: https://www.dronesense.ai/can-russias-rassvet-satellites-threaten-ukraine-with-better-drone-strikes/
- Published: 2026-09-25T04:44:56.000Z
- Updated: 2026-09-25T09:43:14.000Z
- Description: Russia is doubling down on building an independent satellite network, Rassvet, for more lethal drone strikes against Ukraine. Despite several delays, scoped testing has already begun, leaving Kyiv with less time to spin a solution than it might have bargained for.
- Author: Drone Sense
- Tags: Ukraine, Russia, satellite, satcom

Russia's satellite network, Rassvet, is likely just months away from initial drone missions.

Though Rassvet’s deployment at present remains uneven and incomplete for end-to-end drone operations, Ukrainian military intelligence is already detecting the use of these assets for military communication by Russian forces on the front lines. While no Russian drone has yet been spotted with a Rassvet terminal for an on-board satellite control link, Ukraine needs to act on the early signs and prepare before Moscow establishes uninterrupted coverage for its long- and medium-range strike drones.

The use of Rassvet for drone missions strongly appears to be just a matter of time, and could begin soon with localized tests in specific areas with high combat activity. Moscow could also reach an initial milestone well before it provides uninterrupted coverage through its sovereign satellite network by simply adopting other redundancies for the control link on its drones.

The problem for Ukraine is that a Russian-owned satellite system can’t be switched off like Musk’s Starlink. Instead, it would entail preparing for another communications channel on top of addressing current gaps in tactical radar coverage and electronic warfare against mesh-connected and autonomous drones. 

> The timing of those parallel efforts could determine how much damage the first deployments may cause.

### **A Constellation Taking Shape Unevenly**

So far, Russia has launched 32 production satellites in 2 batches, alongside 6 earlier experimental spacecraft. The production launches took place in March and July 2026, with Bureau 1440's published timeline confirming that the transition from experimental missions to deployment. And, while launch announcements do not establish which spacecraft are providing service, they definitely signal high intent.

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/e6/62/e662d7a6-04ff-4444-9a82-4a7463552003/content/images/2026/09/mermaid-diagram--1-.png)

The latest Russian announcement placed 13 spacecraft from the first production batch around 510 km, with 2 near 360 km and 1 lost through atmospheric re-entry. Of the second batch, 13 were still climbing, while 3 remained around or below 300 km, suggesting this is still work in progress, with expected delays. It remains unclear whether the observed formation represents testing or a revised operating shell. In parallel, Rassvet’s orbital presence says little about usable capacity, handover reliability or service availability.

But the originally planned 800 km altitude, which is the ideal height needed, should be treated with caution because satellites can communicate below that height. Lower operation usually changes its footprint, atmospheric drag and constellation requirements, but it does not automatically make the spacecraft unusable. 

### **How Rassvet Satellites Could Impact Russian Drone Strikes?**

Ukrainian military intelligence recently reported that Russian forces had used Rassvet communications over Ukraine for several hours by late July, indicating some degree of early testing. The test supported a limited military capability, while leaving the connected equipment and quality of service undisclosed. It showed what Russia’s dominant use case would be for Rassvet.

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/e6/62/e662d7a6-04ff-4444-9a82-4a7463552003/content/images/2026/09/mermaid-diagram--3--1.png)

For assessing future use, the distinction must be made between occasional connectivity and sustained operator control. 

A long-range drone can navigate autonomously between communications sessions. If an airborne link becomes available, it could exchange status information or receive updated instructions without remaining connected throughout its flight. This is a potential benefit of satellite communications.

This will likely make Russian long-range Gerans harder to intercept using current Ukrainian EW countermeasures, as they keep switching between control links. A disproportionate weight could then fall upon kinetic solutions, which rely heavily on radar cueing and fast sensor-to-shooter chains, to intercept these satellite-linked drones. In the short term, operationalizing these countermeasures would potentially be expensive and time-consuming, and could end up impacting advances Ukraine has secured since the start of 2026.

For medium-range missions, on the other hand, involving live video generally places greater demands on continuity. An operator responding to a changing scene needs a usable image and timely commands. Interruptions during satellite handovers, variable latency or inadequate uplink capacity could limit that benefit even when a spacecraft remains visible overhead. 

### **Sovereign Access Changes the Relationship**

Russia already has experience with the operational value and political vulnerability of foreign satellite connectivity, after Ukraine had unauthorized Russian Starlink terminals blocked through cooperation with SpaceX. The communication problems which ensued in the Russian forces in the aftermath, coupled with the reported mess of their command and control operations, which had become reliant on Starlink, were attributed to having caused territorial losses in the months down the line. 

> But it is possible that Russia traded short-term pain for long-term sovereignty in its military space operations. 

A Russian-controlled service removes dependence on SpaceX's authorization decisions entirely. It could also reduce reliance on extended terrestrial relay chains for suitably equipped drones. While neither change makes drones completely immune to interference or interception, it gives Russia another communications option whose access rules it controls. 

In parallel, this complicates Ukraine's ability to deny connectivity through direct cooperation with the provider. It will have to approach international bodies, which it did, whose consensus for operational suspension is harder to attain.

### **Ukraine is Trying to Delay Deployment**

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/e6/62/e662d7a6-04ff-4444-9a82-4a7463552003/content/images/2026/09/ChatGPT-Image-Sep-24--2026--12_27_49-PM-1.png)

(Source: [DroneSense AI](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dronesense-ai%5Fsatellite-rassvet-ukraine-activity-7508782654260092928-49Ex??ref=dronesense.ai))

Kyiv has begun applying pressure before the network reaches maturity. On 2 September, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry publicly called for sanctions against Rassvet and Roscosmos. A subsequent official statement again identified the constellation as an emerging technological threat requiring coordinated sanctions action. 

Ukraine has also sought to exclude its territory from Rassvet's declared service areas through the International Telecommunication Union. Such action can strengthen regulatory and diplomatic pressure, but should not be described as a technical switch that prevents unauthorized wartime use. 

The impact of satellite-linked drones on the battlefield is best illustrated by the wins secured by Ukraine’s own middle-strike campaign against Russian logistics, particularly in Crimea and the Black Sea. 

Field reporting from the 422nd Unmanned Systems Regiment describes how satellite-connected drones are operated remotely and have been regularly used against Russian rear-area logistics to choke off strategic nodes that fuel their frontline operations. 

Russia’s answer has been to equip its logistical vehicles with its own anti-drone measures, including interceptor drones, mobile fire group escorts or corridors covered with anti-drone mesh nets. But each countermeasure has only been partially effective against satellite-linked drones that have persistent connectivity, control redundancies, and an ability to make the defender reach for a more expensive solution.

### **Mesh networks have already exposed the adaptation problem**

Russia's existing drone communications provide a rather immediate warning. Examination of recovered hardware shows mesh radios on several Russian fixed-wing platforms, including Geran and Molniya variants, enabling them to pass data through other nodes. This helps in extending communications beyond a single direct link and ultimately improves the probability of the drone not being intercepted by the defender’s air defense systems.

Their effectiveness, however, still depends on network geometry, surviving connections and available capacity. 

Recovered devices and observed transmissions also suggest that Russia is diversifying its frequencies rather than relying on one standardized channel. The associated electronic-warfare challenge appears to extend across several modem bands now, as changing radio-frequency becomes a common tactic on both sides.

What is worrying is that reportedly systematic work against these Russian modems had been neglected for approximately a year, despite interference being possible. 

> The reason largely hinged on an institutional and deployment gap, which has often slowed down translation of observed frontline challenges into widely fielded solutions before the problem becomes too big.

The implication is that technical understanding can arrive well before widespread protection, but recovering a modem, identifying its behavior and proving a countermeasure are only part of the response. Equipment must also be funded, produced, integrated and maintained across threatened areas And, a new satellite link from the enemy adds another demand to that unfinished process.

### **Radar gaps remain even if the link can be disrupted**

Ukraine's defensive problem begins well before engagement and could be exacerbated by Rassvets deployment, which may spur the use of kinetic solutions more. 

Kyiv continues to face slow counter-mesh development and shortages of mass-produced electronic warfare against drone video channels. At the same time, interceptor drones need denser tactical radar coverage to operate effectively, which Ukraine does not have enough of presently.

While satellite connectivity would not change a drone's radar signature by itself, more resilient control could increase the number of drones remaining operational after encountering existing defenses. 

Interceptor teams would need timely tracks, identification and engagement coordination, and in this case, having additional interceptors has limited value where sensors cannot provide enough warning to use them.

This creates pressure on several budgets simultaneously because Ukraine may need improved sensing, communications analysis and suitable electronic countermeasures while continuing to purchase interceptors and conventional air-defense ammunition. On top of this all, equipment designed for one communications channel cannot be assumed to suppress a different satellite service without testing.

### **The airborne terminal may set the pace for Rassvet**

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/e6/62/e662d7a6-04ff-4444-9a82-4a7463552003/content/images/2026/09/Screenshot-2026-09-25-at-9.55.30---AM.png)

A system operating at higher orbital altitude may require a larger, heavier or more powerful airborne terminal.

Bureau 1440's publicly described user terminal measures up to 60 cm in length and width and weighs no more than 15 kg. The company describes an electronically steered antenna that acquires and maintains satellite contact.

For a drone, terminal integration affects payload allowance, power demand, cooling, antenna visibility and aerodynamic installation. A large drone may accommodate equipment that a smaller disposable drone cannot, but physical carriage alone does not establish dependable operation during flight. Proper integration on drones will be crucial.

Bureau 1440 has claimed that it produced terminals for its 2026 testing program, but their exact quantity or serial military deliveries remain undisclosed. Its advertised network performance, including speeds up to 1 Gbps and latency below 70 milliseconds, is yet to be verified in airborne performance. 

But if Russia is pursuing the same model of fast iteration through combat feedback that it does with its drones, then it won’t be long before testing of these terminals takes place to fast-track improvement.

> Here, economics plays a pivotal role because disposable drones can consume the communications equipment they carry, making sustained demand different from equipping reusable ground stations. Russia might initially concentrate available terminals on selected platforms, with higher rates of success. 

### **Launch Output Leaves a Substantial Gap**

Russia’s schedule envisaged 156 Rassvet satellites by the end of 2026 and 292 active spacecraft by the end of 2027\. Against that, the 2 observed production launches only carried 16 satellites each, with reporting in August identifying 7 further planned launches needed that year. All of which illustrates the gap between the planned cadence and deployment achieved at that point. 

And, these numbers establish delivered batches, not factory capacity, which is more telling of how sustainable the operations are. Satellites could simply be awaiting launch, undergoing acceptance or requiring modification, while further production could depend on components and test equipment. 

Without knowing the true output figure, describing Russia as manufacturing only 32 satellites would be half the picture. Equally, the state schedule should not be treated as demonstrated annual production.

Reaching a larger fleet also requires successful commissioning, distribution across orbital planes and reliable transfers between spacecraft. So, what is needed is assessing how many satellites deliver service, as well as how many leave the launchpad. Often, replacement demand and launch availability absorb resources that would otherwise expand coverage.

> An expert estimate on 20 September placed uninterrupted coverage over Ukraine in 2028 under an optimistic scenario, with delays potentially extending to 2030\. 

But limited airborne trials could precede it substantially, with timing highly dependent on terminal readiness and functioning communications windows. 

### **Waiting Could Be Disastrous?** 

The concern for Ukraine is a mismatch between initial Russian deployment and the scale of defensive coverage required. A limited number of connected aircraft could test a new capability while Ukraine still needs to establish its characteristics, validate responses and distribute equipment. The resources needed to introduce a capability selectively can differ considerably from those needed to defend many dispersed locations.

In fact, counter-Rassvet electronic warfare should already protect key infrastructure when the threat emerges, because otherwise preparation would be expensive and time-consuming. 

Ukraine's experience with Russian attempts to suppress Starlink also shows that adaptation continues after deployment. The 422nd Regiment described attacks on Russian satellite-jamming equipment and said its effectiveness had varied. 

The burden would likely entail more than developing an initial jammer because procurement, installation, training, maintenance and updating would have to continue as Russian equipment changes. If airborne Rassvet integration succeeds first, Ukraine would most likely face a period of weaker protection at some sites. 

> Regulatory and diplomatic pressure can buy Ukraine some preparation time, but its value will depend on how Kyiv uses it to turn technical research into deployable solutions. 

Russia still faces substantial integration and industrial constraints, while Ukraine faces its own production and coverage demands. The operational outcome will depend on which side closes those gaps first and who is able to successfully defend individual sites and work towards affordable national coverage.

### **What to Watch For**

- **Airborne integration:** Independently verified terminal recoveries or sustained flight tests would strengthen the case for near-term missions. Ground demonstrations alone would leave that assessment uncertain.
- **Deployment versus protection:** Additional operational orbital planes and demonstrated handovers could expand the threat before Ukrainian countermeasures reach scale. Evidence of deployed protection would indicate whether that gap is narrowing.

#### Sources:  

[****\[1\] Janes. “Ukraine's defence intelligence says Russian forces used Rassvet satellites for ‘several hours.’”**](https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/air/ukraines-defence-intelligence-says-russian-forces-used-rassvet-satellites-for-several-hours?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[2\] Bureau 1440\. Official project timeline.**](https://1440.space/en/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[3\] RFE/RL. “Russia's Starlink Rival Faces Problems In Orbit And Threats On The Ground.”**](https://www.rferl.org/amp/russia-rassvet-starlink-satellite-internet-ukraine/33858763.html?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[4\] Reuters. “Ukraine says Starlink terminals used by Russia deactivated in blow to Moscow.”**](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/starlink-used-by-russian-forces-deactivated-battlefield-ukraine-says-2026-02-05/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[5\] The Kyiv Independent. “As Russia adapts to Ukraine's middle strikes, elite drone units stay ahead of the curve.”**](https://kyivindependent.com/inside-the-ukrainian-drone-unit-controlling-russian-occupied-crimeas-highways/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[6\] Calibre Defence / KI Insights. “Mesh networks: How Russia is increasing the range of its drones.”**](https://www.calibredefence.co.uk/mesh-networks-how-russia-is-increasing-the-range-of-its-drones/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[7\] Ukrainska Pravda. “Russian Shahed and Gerbera drones form radio network for real-time control, says expert.”**](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/11/28/8009449/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[8\] Interfax-Ukraine. “Presidential adviser: Russia attacks Ukraine with mesh-controlled Shahed UAVs, no countermeasures taken.”**](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1206760.html?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[9\] Ukrainska Pravda. “Ukrainian defence ministry adviser names Ukraine's main technological problems in war.”**](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/29/8041560/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[10\] Bureau 1440\. Official channel: user-terminal announcement.**](https://t.me/s/bureau%5F1440?before=112&ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[11\] Ukrainian International Strategy Center. “From Plans to Orbit: The First Test of Russia's Rassvet.”**](https://uisc.eu/blog/from%5Fplans%5Fto%5Forbit%5Fthe%5Ffirst%5Ftest%5Fof%5Frussias%5Frassvet/?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[12\] ComNews. “В ожидании ‘Рассвета’. До конца 2026 г. у ‘Бюро 1440’ осталось еще 7 пусков.”**](https://www.comnews.ru/content/246700/2026-08-04/2026-w32/1007/ozhidanii-rassveta-do-konca-2026-g-u-byuro-1440-ostalos-esche-7-puskov?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[13\] New Voice of Ukraine. “Presidential adviser warns Russia could steer Shahed drones and missiles via satellite.”**](https://english.nv.ua/nation/serhii-flash-warns-that-russia-could-gain-ability-to-control-missiles-and-suicide-drones-online-50642995.html?ref=dronesense.ai)

[****\[14\] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. “Andrii Sybiha participated in the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers and presented Ukraine's position.”**](https://mfa.gov.ua/news/andrij-sibiga-vzyav-uchast-u-neformalnij-zustrichi-ministriv-zakordonnih-sprav-yes-ta-predstaviv-poziciyu-ukrayini?ref=dronesense.ai)