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Weekly Intelligence Brief

Why directed energy isn't used in Ukraine | Chinese submarine mothership | Is a smart missile a drone? | Solar powered FPVs | Drones hunt trains

Weekly Intelligence Brief
Satellite images captured by a US defence intelligence company show what assessed as likely a submarine mothership in development - 2026 Vantor

Welcome to this week’s Brief, our analysis of the most consequential developments in unmanned systems and drone warfare. Each week we track rapidly accelerating battlefield innovations, emerging doctrine, and the technologies reshaping how states and non-state actors deploy unmanned systems.

Have intelligence requirements, developments we should investigate, or perspectives to share? Contact us at info@dronesense.ai.


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Deep Dive: Why Don’t Russia and Ukraine Use Direct Energy Weapons Much Against Drones?

The West is betting a lot on directed-energy weapons (DEWs) to protect its critical sites. Recently, the Pentagon awarded $86 million in initial contracts under a new laser programme, while its FY2027 budget proposal included more than $2 billion for DEW research, development and testing. Across the pond, the UK allocated £790 million over 4 years to a broader package for protecting its homeland and overseas bases from air, drone and missile threats, including new sensors, counter-drone systems, air-defence upgrades and DEW.

But surprisingly, evidence of the operational impact of DEWs remains quite thin in Ukraine, which has become a combat-testing environment for many emerging Western counter-drone technologies.

Logically, if lasers and radio frequency weapons can defeat drones for a fraction of the cost of missiles, the world’s most drone-intensive war should provide some of the strongest conditions for their adoption. But neither Russia nor Ukraine has shown sustained deployment, despite both sides having ongoing DEW programmes.

Russia conducted large-scale anti-drone laser tests in 2025, while Ukraine said in July 2026 that domestic lasers could intercept FPVs and were being adapted against Shaheds.

One reason behind this absence is that each drone type creates a different engagement problem.

FPVs fly close to terrain and can remain outside line of sight until their final approach. This gives a laser only seconds to detect, track and hold its beam on a flight-critical component. Protecting moving units across a long frontline would also require many power- and sensor-dependent DEW nodes close to enemy fire.

Shaheds provide more warning, making them better candidates for laser defence around fixed sites. But Russia disperses them across different routes, altitudes and timings. Since a laser generally engages one target at a time, drones arriving from several directions can saturate its tracking and engagement capacity before every target can be defeated.

Then, there are radio frequency weapons, which can affect multiple drones but only when they enter the effective beam together. A mass attack involving hundreds of dispersed Shaheds does not necessarily create the compact swarm needed for this advantage to hold.

This distinction matters when trial performance is applied to Ukraine. A British radio frequency weapon defeated 2 swarms in one engagement and tracked, engaged and defeated more than 100 drones across the test programme. But its stated range was only 1 km. The trial showed that RF energy can defeat drones concentrated inside its coverage, while a multi-axis Shahed attack may spread targets across several engagement zones.

Maintaining each DEW node also requires sensors, power, cooling, clear firing sectors and conventional fallback systems. The effect must occur early enough to stop the mission. Damaging a sensor or temporarily disrupting electronics creates little defensive value if the aircraft or its warhead still reaches the protected site.

This also qualifies the idea of an “unlimited magazine.” Lasers do not carry conventional ammunition, but dwell time, retargeting and cooling still limit the number of targets they can defeat within one attack window. High-power microwave systems are similarly constrained by range, recharge time and thermal management.

Cost per shot creates another incomplete comparison. It captures the energy used during an engagement while excluding acquisition, sensors, power generation, maintenance, operators and the fallback weapons still required when DEW cannot engage.

Given these constraints, Ukraine has scaled systems that can be distributed faster. EW, mobile guns and interceptor drones can move as attack routes change, while interceptors can pursue targets beyond the firing radius of a ground-based weapon.

Russia faces a different calculation. Its airfields, refineries and military facilities provide more suitable locations for fixed DEW. However, Moscow said the results of its 2025 tests would be used to refine existing systems and move towards serial production and scaling. Its central problem lies in moving from a successful demonstration to producing enough complete defensive nodes to protect geographically dispersed assets.

So, if Western militaries expect to face the same dispersed FPVs, staggered drone waves and multi-directional attacks seen in Ukraine, why does it still make sense for them to invest so heavily in DEW?

The answer sits in what they expect to defend. Ships, airbases, ports, command centres and critical infrastructure all create bounded areas around which sensors, power, cooling and several defensive systems can be concentrated. Western investment is betting that enough threats can be detected and engaged inside these zones for DEW to reduce missile expenditure. Multi-axis attacks could still require several DEW nodes and kinetic fallback systems around the same site. 

But securing mobility with DEW is still difficult. The US Army decided against fielding its 50 kW DE M-SHORAD after tactical testing exposed problems with heat dissipation, electronics and vehicle wear. Inevitably, the war in Ukraine is showing the West both where DEW could work and how an opponent could reduce its value through innovative tactics.


China Watch: Motherships, Swarm Mine Clearing, PLA Air Force Radar Site Defense, Drone Buybacks


On Our Radar:

A satellite image shows the Saudi Arabia East-West pipeline, located across the Arabian Peninsula, after a strike that hit it on September 11, 2026, in Saudi Arabia, September 13, 2026. Vantor
Drone Damage Repair Timelines Become a Key Focus and Market Niche

Damage to Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline could leave the line mostly out of service for three to six weeks, according to officials and industry sources, interrupting a route that had been moving between 2.6 million and 4 million barrels of crude a day to the Red Sea. That range puts an underexamined number at the center of every attack on energy infrastructure: the duration between visible damage and a repair that can actually return an asset to service. The quality of the initial inspection, access to specialized components, and the time needed to recommission damaged equipment now shape the commercial effect of a drone strike, while Russian refinery forecasts increasingly depend on estimates of when a damaged unit will resume production. (Associated Press) (Reuters) (EMOGCP)

Old Kit Gains New Life as Retired Vehicles Are Retrofitted for Autonomy

Textron Aviation and Merlin have built their Cessna SkyCourier UX concept around a familiar proposition for contested logistics: retain the useful airframe and remove the crew from the riskiest leg of the supply chain. The proposed aircraft would carry roughly 6,000 pounds, take off and land autonomously from austere fields, and use an FAA-certified platform already in production, though the program remains in engineering studies. On the ground, militaries are reaching for the same answer with old armored vehicles, adding remote-control and autonomy packages to equipment that can still haul supplies, evacuate casualties or enter exposed areas even after its original frontline role has passed. (Janes) (El Confidencial)

"Prepare to Be Constantly Hunted by Autonomous Drones"

Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told U.S. forces to assume their formations will be hunted, jammed and tracked in real time by autonomous systems, a warning that makes communications denial an unreliable form of cover. He pointed to cheap Ukrainian FPV drones that use computer vision to continue toward targets after GPS is denied or the operator's link is cut, while the Pentagon's AI strategy directs the force to redesign its workflows around current AI capabilities. On Capitol Hill, witnesses were already asking whether an operator can exercise meaningful control when an AI-assisted targeting cycle has compressed past the point where a formal approval button leaves time to identify an error. (DefenseScoop) (Military Times)

Is a Smart Missile a Drone?

Rafael has begun integrating its SPICE 1000 guidance kit with Israeli F-35Is, a program that would give the fighter a 125-kilometre, GPS-denied weapon able to navigate, match a target scene and home after release. Ukraine's Brave1 says several companies are bringing AI into strike missiles, carrying the computer-vision experience of FPV warfare into weapons that have only seconds to correct their flight path. These systems do not have the persistence and retasking associated with many drones. Autonomy is moving deeper into the strike chain, placing more of the targeting decision inside the munition itself. (Defense News) (Business Insider)

Russia Tests Mothership Tactics for Swarm Deployment

Russia is putting a second aircraft behind its FPV penetration problem. Ukrainian units have reported Orlan and Molniya platforms carrying smaller FPV drones and signal relays, allowing the carrier to push an attack farther forward before releasing the systems that will make the final approach. The reported tactic turns one defensive problem into several: an interceptor must find the carrier early enough to prevent the release and then contend with the smaller drones and the extended control network it provides. This emerging layered delivery method can stretch the defended area around Ukrainian logistics routes and rear positions, though it remains unclear how broadly Russia has fielded the approach. (Ukrainska Pravda) (Institute for the Study of War)

Autonomy Suppliers Move Production Closer to the Customer

Rheinmetall Canada has broken ground on a 7,060-square-metre expansion in Quebec to produce, integrate, and sustain its Mission Master ground-robot family, turning a Canadian-developed autonomy stack into a domestic manufacturing and support line. Separately, Echodyne is considering European radar production after Kongsberg selected its MESA sensors for Protector remote weapon stations, pursuing the same proximity to a counter-drone market where local content increasingly determines who stays inside the procurement system. (Rheinmetall) (Defense News)


Hardware Innovations and Tactical Adaptations

A captured Russian FPV ‘ambush’ drone equipped with a small solar panel. Source: Telegram

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